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On Comparing Ancient Chinese and Greek
Ethics: The tertium comparationis as Tool
of Analysis and Evaluation
Everything is comparable with everything else in one respect or another. Incom-
parability, strictly speaking, is a misnomer, for any such claim of incomparability
cannot but must rest on a prior comparison of what is then considered to be in-
comparable (except perhaps if the incomparability is merely definitional, i.e.
without descriptive value, such as God being posited as beyond comparison,
cf. Isaiah 40:25). Perhaps incomparability is to be understood rather in terms
of some specific respect to which only the claim is thought to apply. The prover-
bial apples and oranges are both generically fruit, grow on trees and are edible,
but they are also, say, smaller in size than non-embryonic elephants are. In all
these respects, what we have is straightforward comparability. Still, they might
be claimed to be incomparable, for instance, in respect of their metaphysical es-
sences, i.e. of appleness and orangeness, since in that sense, an apple is some-
thing essentially different from an orange. To be essentially different, however,
does not mean to be incomparable. For any such claim of incomparability qua
essential difference is at the same time limited by the fact that, without the as-
sertion of at least one commonality, such difference could not possibly be claim-
ed. That commonality lies, trivially, in the capacity for both relata to be related to
the feature for which incomparability is asserted. That apples and oranges have
metaphysical essences, or may be related to talk of metaphysical essences, is of
course a claim itself, but more importantly it is a claim of commonality, even if
each such an essence is otherwise thought to be unique to the point of escaping
all assertions of common respects. To be unique means to be different in all pos-
sible respects. In other words, if there putatively is no commonality and only dif-
ferences, then these differences are still differences with regard to something,
and that something is an asserted commonality at the very least in terms of im-
plying a common relatability to the regard in which one or the other difference is
claimed. Hence, when comparing, there is necessarily an assertion of common-
ality.
The catch-phrase comparing apples and oranges is of course not only all too
often appealed to in such contexts, it is probably also being misused. For the
sense of incomparability that it seeks to express is tied to a use of the term “com-
parable” that emphasizes the commonality of two comparata so greatly as to
consider them to be “more or less the same”, to be “substitutable” – or, inverse-
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ly, with regard to the proverb’s apples and oranges “not” to be the “same”, “not”
to be “substitutable”. If a football player is fouled, seriously hurt and needs to be
substituted (and no change of tactic seems desirable), the coach then might want
to think of a “comparable” player sitting on the bench. If the fouled and hurt soc-
cer player in question happens to be Lionel Messi, the “incomparable” Lionel
Messi, no substitute on the bench might possibly be considered a substitute.
“Comparable” and “incomparable” in these senses are mostly either about com-
monality only or the complete absence thereof. They come close to be synonyms
of “substitutable” and “not substitutable”.When the coach is looking for a com-
parable player on the bench, no judgement is passed on the overall comparabil-
ity of these players in terms of commonalities and differences (or similarities and
dissimilarities), i.e. no answer to the question whether or not they can be com-
pared. In fact, it is the asserted lack of much commonality and the abundance of
difference, hence the fact that Messi is “comparable” with other players in a sec-
ond sense of the term that makes him “incomparable” in the first sense. Messi is
“comparable” and “incomparable”.
The distinction between these two senses of “comparable” is fundamental to
the topic of this chapter, because comparisons of ancient China and Greece usu-
ally mean to appeal to the second sense, to the question of comparability in
terms of commonalities and differences, where incomparability simply is not
an option. If in the context of such a study the comparer comes to state that an-
cient China and Greece are “comparable”, he or she would be stating the obvi-
ous, but the statement would usually not mean to say that they are as such
“more or less the same” or “substitutable”. That would be a rather boring and
probably a superficial statement. However, it is of the utmost importance to un-
derstand that any comparison between ancient China and Greece partially but
necessarily builds on a series of commonalities; and with regard to these assert-
ed commonalities only, ancient China and Greece are really being claimed to be
mutually “substitutable”. So if we compare ancient China and ancient Greece for
their “ethics”, we minimally must claim that both comparata are relatable to
some same concept of “ethics”. That aspect of ancient Chinese ethics is of neces-
sity substitutable with the corresponding aspect of ancient Greek ethics, because
it is the same aspect. The technical term for this common aspect of two (or more)
comparata is tertium comparationis: the third of comparison.¹
 Although the subject matter expressed by the tertium comparationis is dealt with, for example,
in the context of metaphors in Plato (Laches a–b), Aristotle (Topics a–; Poetics
b; Rhetoric b), Cicero (De Oratore, III, XXXIX, ), and Quintillian (Institutio Oratoria,
VIII, VI, ), the expression itself is attested only as late as in the Baroque period. The Enzy-
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In this chapter, I introduce the tertium comparationis alongside a set of relat-
ed distinctions as a tool of analysis helping us to understand better the presup-
positions and claims of any given comparison. I also ask whether and to what
extent this set of distinctions can serve us as an evaluative tool which helps
us to distinguish between successful and failed comparison. Throughout, my
focus is on comparisons of ancient Chinese and Greek philosophy, in general,
and of ethics, in particular. Fairly recently this field of studies (the present vol-
ume features some of the main proponents) has acquired the label “Sino-Hellen-
ic studies”. This term is found in Steven Shankman and Stephen W. Durrant’s in-
troduction to their edited collection of essays entitled Early China/Ancient
Greece: Thinking through Comparisons (2002: p. 1). The label has lately been
brought to prominence by Jeremy Tanner’s highly instructive review article on
Sino-Hellenic studies (2009: p. 105), which, he makes clear, are not in any
way exclusively devoted to philosophy, but also to medicine, mathematics or lit-
erature (that broader and cross-fertilizing perspective being its purported
strength and originality). In his review, Tanner approaches Sino-Hellenic studies
from the viewpoint of a classicist. I have myself recently tried to discuss Tanner’s
contribution and Sino-Hellenic studies in general from the viewpoint of compa-
rative philosophy, arguing that not every text in comparative philosophy that
somehow draws on ancient China and ancient Greece should automatically be
understood to be about “Sino-Hellenic comparative philosophy” (Weber,
2013a). In the present chapter, I intend to follow up questions that have not
been addressed satisfactorily in my previous writing on the topic, particularly
the relationship of what I call the pre-comparative tertium and what is conven-
tionally called the tertium comparationis in terms of the use this distinction
might have for analytic and evaluative purposes (Weber, 2013b; 2014a). This re-
quires understanding comparison as a process.
I Introducing the Tool of Analysis
Analytically, four aspects of comparison are readily distinguished: 1. A compar-
ison is always made by someone; 2. At least two relata (comparata) are com-
pared; 3. The comparata are compared in some respect (tertium comparationis);
and 4. The result of a comparison is a relation between the comparata in view of
the respect chosen. Obviously, much hinges on there being a comparer who for
klopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie mentions Erhard Weigel and his  book
Philosophia Mathematica, see: Thiel (: pp. –).
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some reason or another has come to believe that, although everything is some-
how comparable with everything else, the chosen comparata are particularly
worthy of being thrown together side by side (παραβάλλειν), i.e, that they should
be compared. It is therefore, I submit, helpful to distinguish a fifth aspect that is
to be located in the above, roughly chronological characterisation of comparison
between the first and second aspects: 5. The two (or more) comparata share a
pre-comparative tertium, constituted by at least one commonality (i.e. being
chosen for comparison by the comparer) and probably by many more common-
alities (tertia). Crucially, most of these commonalities are already well establish-
ed (even if only vaguely, implicitly or unaware by the comparer) before the com-
parer sets out to compare them.
To give a simple example: If I seek to compare “the ancient religious texts of
China and Greece for their conception of the good life”, then there is a series of
comparative claims that I posit simply by describing my undertaking in these
and not other terms. For instance, I presuppose that talk of “ancient”, of “reli-
gious”, and of “texts” both in China and in Greece is apposite, that these are use-
ful categorizations, descriptions or qualifications. I also posit that China and
Greece represent a meaningful or even a particularly meaningful division with
regard to ancient religious texts and conceptions of the good life, although
what I understand by China and Greece is open for further investigation. It
might be a host of things: two geographical realms, two cultural spheres, two civ-
ilizations, two contemporary economic players, the two most important, or two
out of a few or of many, and so forth. There might be further and less obvious
comparative claims that I am making. For instance, it seems that I would also
be making a claim about the particular usefulness or adequacy of contempora-
neous comparison. Or why else would I turn to “ancient” texts in both cases? All
of these aspects represent presupposed commonalities of the comparata – China
and Greece – that are firmly established before I set out to undertake the com-
parison. It is these commonalities that my notion of the pre-comparative tertium
refers to.
At this juncture, a second, related distinction must be introduced. In earlier
writing and up to this point in this chapter, I have indiscriminately referred to
comparata, but I now wish to refer to that which the comparer sets out to com-
pare, that which is to be compared, as comparanda and to refer to that which is
and comes to have been compared in the course of the comparison as comparata
(cf. also Weber, 2014b). In light of this distinction, the pre-comparative tertium
emerges as a privileged vantage point for analysis of comparisons. With regard
to the comparer, it may give us an opportunity, inasmuch as there is any such
opportunity, to uncover the reasons and purposes attached to the comparison
and to reconstruct some of the presuppositions guiding the comparer’s under-
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standing of the comparanda on the mere basis of the given text comprising the
comparison. For it may be a rare case, if it exists at all, that a comparer compares
two (or more) comparata without having any presupposition whatsoever that has
led him or her to choose these comparanda and not others. In academic compar-
ison, where the universe of cases is always in one or another way predefined,
such a case can safely be ruled out. To the extent that the choice of comparanda
is not random, but (also) motivated by asserted commonalities (beyond the one
commonality of each being a comparandum), knowledge of these commonalities
is itself the result of prior comparison. For how else can you come to hold that
two objects (or events, or whatever) share a commonality, if you have not put
them next to one another and compared them with the result of finding a rela-
tion of commonality between them?
From a broader perspective, the pre-comparative tertia of a given compari-
son are often drawn from earlier comparisons (they are in this sense post-com-
parative), while the given comparison will necessarily produce new post-compa-
rative tertia (perhaps in turn used in later comparisons as pre-comparative
tertia). Thus emerges the dynamic picture of a great chain of comparisons. As im-
portant as it would be to understand this inevitable broader context vis-à-vis a
given case of comparison, it is also pertinent to understand as much as possible
the exact workings of the case in hand. The distinctions between comparanda
and comparata as well as of the pre-comparative tertium, the tertium comparatio-
nis and the post-comparative tertium offer an analytically refined take on the ar-
tificially isolated given case of a single comparison – which looked at more
closely, however, turns out to contain just another chain and complex structure
of comparisons informing the resulting relation of the overall comparison.What
my proposed vocabulary hence helps to highlight (and to analyse) is the inner
dynamic of a given case of comparison, as it is for instance advanced in the
many scholarly articles or research projects announcing a comparative study
in their title.
The inner dynamic of a given case of comparison marks an important gap
that any comparative inquiry produces. When choosing to compare two compa-
randa, the comparer has some presupposition or presumed knowledge of what
these comparanda are. When then comparing them, each in the light of the
other, the comparer it seems of necessity acquires new knowledge about the
comparanda, i.e. knowledge that he or she could not possibly have possessed
before the comparison: hence the gap between what the comparanda are and
what the comparata are in the understanding or knowledge of the comparer. Dis-
tinguishing carefully between the comparanda and the comparata helps prevent
us fall into a kind of Meno’s paradox of inquiry, for the knowledge that the com-
parer ends up with is clearly different from the knowledge he or she began with,
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due to the effort of further inquiry.² The paradox presupposes that any inquiry is
such that what one starts off with inquiring is the same that what one ends up
with. It is perhaps intuitively most persuasive regarding questions of the Socratic
type, such as “what is virtue?”, “what is truth?” etc. Regarding comparative in-
quiry, the paradox in the last instance fails to be persuasive, and drawing the
distinction between comparanda and comparata (if that is a meaningful distinc-
tion), I believe, dissolves the paradox.
Distinguishing between comparanda and comparata, however, should not
mislead us into thinking that the two are in any way neatly distinct. In the proc-
ess of comparison, comparanda are being transformed into comparata. The two
terms demarcate an analytic distinction for what are two different stages in that
transformation. But very obviously, and without going into the intricate meta-
physical problems of the nature of change, alteration and transformation, the
claim must be that the resulting comparata are still in some important sense
the same as the initial comparanda. In one sense, but not in another; for they
are the same and they are different.Were they not the same in any sense, merely
different, then the comparison would not have been about what it was supposed
(and perhaps announced) to be about. Would they be just the same and no dif-
ferent, then no inquiry and no comparison would have taken place.³
So one way of investigating the inner dynamics of a given comparison is to
ask a set of questions, first and foremost those corresponding to the distinguish-
ed five aspects of comparison:
1. Who is performing the comparison?
2. What commonality supports the choice of what is to be compared?
3. What is being compared with what?
4. In what respect(s) does the comparer compare that which he or she com-
pares?
5. What relation results from comparing what the comparer compares in that
respect?
 In Plato’s dialogue Meno, Socrates rephrases a paradox with which Meno seeks to challenge
him: “Do you realize what a debater’s argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search
either for what he knows – since he knows it, there is no need to search – nor for what he does
not know, for he does not know what to look for.” (Meno, e, trans. G.M.A. Grube).
 This may seem overstated. Perhaps I should say, no “productive” comparison has taken place.
Any new respect in which two comparanda are compared adds a feature to those comparanda
that transforms them in the eyes of the comparer who has hitherto not looked at them from that
respect. A person who uses only respects that he or she has used before in exactly the same
manner does not compare with an interest of finding something new, but rather confirms
what he or she had compared earlier.
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And in the light of the above set of distinctions:
6. How does the choice of the pre-comparative tertium restrict the realm of pos-
sible tertia comparationis?
7. How does a chosen tertium comparationis qualify the comparanda?
8. What role do the comparanda play in the result of the comparison?
9. …
These and further questions may be raised in view of any scholarly comparison.
Obviously, the questions are not easily answered. On the basis of the text com-
prising the comparison only, a pre-comparative tertium and a tertium compara-
tionis may be identified relatively easily. In each case, the analyst simply notes
the explicit assertions of commonality. Each such assertion amounts to a
claim of commonality that might or might not be persuasive, and hence might
be subject to criticism or to demands for further clarification, substantiation,
and so forth.
The analysis of a text comprising a comparison will bring out claims of com-
monality at the levels of what the comparanda are thought to be (pre-compara-
tive tertium), against which common regards they may be further compared (ter-
tium comparationis), and of what characterizes the nature of the comparata that
emerge from the comparison (post-comparative tertium). The status accorded to
the chosen tertia comparationis plays a crucial role in the transformation of the
comparanda into comparata. Each respect in which the two comparanda are
compared may but perhaps need not qualify the nature of the comparanda, de-
pending on whether one thinks of the respect as expressing an ontological or
merely a heuristic relation to the comparanda and whether one buys into that
distinction of ontological vs. heuristic. Such an analysis of tertia that are explic-
itly asserted in a text is finite, to be sure, but a large part of the text may turn out
to be relevant. If we compare ancient China and ancient Greece for their ethics,
any qualification of any of these terms matters as a qualification of the pre- or
post-comparative tertia. In this way, a huge map of claims emerges. To what ex-
tent such an analysis will prove useful, is itself questionable, but it should be
clear enough that the main comparative claims of a text should be susceptible
to this kind of scrutiny.⁴
 For an analysis along these lines, see: Weber (c).
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II Exemplary Analyses
Before offering exemplary analyses of two texts that in my view comprise highly
sophisticated comparisons, some important tensions present from the outset of
my analysis of these comparisons should be noted. One of the many contexts of
these texts is constituted by the disciplinary and other labels to which the texts
are related. The two texts are, for instance, related by me to the label indicated in
my title, “ancient Greek and Chinese ethics”, but often they are simultaneously
related to a label in their more immediate context of presentation. The text by
Jean-Paul Reding that I want to analyse, “Greek and Chinese Categories”
(2004), is one essay of many by him collected in a volume with the label
“early Greek and Chinese rational thinking” in its title.Whereas my title announ-
ces my text to be about “ethics”, Reding’s text is by himself somehow related to
“rational thinking”, and it is obvious that by including Reding’s text in my ana-
lysis, I somehow (in what might appear to stretch the matter quite a bit) relate his
text to “ethics”.Whereas I refer to “ancient”, he refers to “early”, which might be
an insignificant variation, but it might also be expressive of some significant dif-
ference in terms of the invoked temporality. Again, by including Reding’s text in
my analysis, I somehow turn his “early” into my “ancient”. It should be clear
that these are merely the more obvious examples, but that some such similar
process of appropriation also occurs with the terms “Greek and Chinese” in
spite of their deceptive co-presence in all labels. Similarly with my second exam-
ple, a text by Andrew Plaks (2002) published in the already mentioned collection
of essays with the label “early China/ancient Greece” in its title: here some sig-
nificance is clearly attributed to the variation of “early” and “ancient” (although
the introduction gives no clue as to what significance the variation is meant to
carry, using all possible combinations with the exception of “ancient China/
early Greece”, which leaves some room for speculation). Plaks’s title refers to
“Aristotle’s Ethics and the Zhongyong”, which highlights two texts, one of
which seems, at first glance at least, rather straightforwardly to relate to my
title and its mention of “ethics”. The two texts are related to Greek and Chinese,
respectively, although it is unknown whether, say, it is being claimed that Aris-
totle’s Ethics represents all of “Greek ethics” or just a part of it. The Zhongyong of
course could also be related to “ethics”, it could fill in the part for “Chinese eth-
ics”; it could, however, also simply be used in a contrastive comparison and not
be about ethics at all.⁵
 Given that Reding’s essay appears in a collection of essays by Reding himself, whereas Plaks’s
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Each of these labels posits a series of claims of commonality and difference,
or of similarity and dissimilarity, and the mentioned tensions of the several la-
bels arise due to differences in such claims. Take, for example, the title of my
paper. Whoever sets out to compare “ancient Chinese and Greek ethics” and ex-
plicitly conceptualizes the subject-matter to be compared in these terms thereby
shows commitment to a series of claims, including the claim that there is some
benefit in comparing it using these and not other terms. Clearly, there is a claim
about the meaningfulness of using the word “ethics” here and there, as well as
the word “ancient”. In some sense, both comparanda must be related to each of
these words in the same manner, which is not to say that there is exactly the
same, full-blown ethics or antiquity in both cases (which would make it point-
less to compare in that respect). One would perhaps (but not necessarily)
draw on a different series of claims if the title were rephrased as comparing “Chi-
nese lunlixue and Greek ethics” or “Chinese daode and Greek ethika”, making
use of Chinese terms for which “ethics” has come to serve as a translation.
Obviously, an important claim of difference is introduced by the terms
“Greek” and “Chinese”, which must somehow relate to “ethics” and “ancient”,
but which probably are also informed by a series of background assumptions
that are not spelt out in the title, but often are explicit in the text itself. It is
thus that “Greek” and “Chinese” may somehow refer to philosophies, cultures,
mentalities, ways of life, civilizations, languages, textual corpora, or the birth-
place of modern Europe and China, or – viewed from another angle – “Greek”
may stand for a large number of poleis, for Athens only, for Athens at a certain
period in time, or for Aristotle, and so forth, as “Chinese” may be a stand-in for
pre-Qin Warring States China, for the state of Lu, for Mengzi, etc. Yet, as should
be clear by now, any claim of difference includes a claim of commonality, albeit
perhaps each at a different level, that is expressed as the answer to the question:
“in what respect are they different?” Hence, if “Greek” and “Chinese” are meant
to articulate a difference based on the background assumption of referring, say,
to two “different” cultures, then the comparer at the same time posits a claim of
commonality, i.e. of the common applicability of the term “culture”.
It is these claims, certainly those explicitly articulated, but also to some ex-
tent those only implicitly introduced, that a focus on tertia comparationis and
pre-comparative tertia may help bring into the open. It is from this perspective,
then, that I wish to speak of a “tool of analysis” and test its effectiveness when
applied to comparative texts.
essay appears in a collection edited by a third party, we might be looking for more coherence
between the essay title and the collection in Reding’s case.
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Analysis of “Greek and Chinese Categories”
Reding’s essay on “Greek and Chinese Categories” is not a straightforward com-
parison of Greek and Chinese categories, since much of it is devoted to the ques-
tion of whether in ancient Chinese texts there is something like a list of catego-
ries that could serve as the second comparandum in a comparison with Greek
categories. In brief, Reding in turn offers three distinct answers to this question:
(1) It is wrong to presume the necessary existence of Chinese categories
(Benveniste, Granet) or construct a list of Chinese categories (Graham)
as relative to the Chinese language.
(2) Our evidence tells us that Chinese philosophy did not have a list of
categories.
(3) A list of Chinese categories can be reconstructed based on a close ex-
amination of the problems that Chinese texts and Aristotle’s list of cat-
egories were similarly conceived of as answering to (Reding).
Having thus established Chinese categories, Reding then sets out to compare
them to the Greek categories. Given this setting, we learn a lot about Reding’s in-
tentions behind his comparison (rejecting two mistaken views and putting forth
his own view) and would of course learn even more were we to undertake a fuller
analysis and also consider his other chapters and particularly his introduction.
But for the purposes of this chapter, I will simply focus on this one text and es-
pecially on Reding’s comparison between Greek and Chinese categories.
The question of what is compared with what in Reding’s essay has an easy
answer, namely Greek and Chinese categories, as well as a more complex answer
if we take into account the pre-comparative tertia informing the choice of com-
paranda in view of the involved words, i.e. “Greek”, “Chinese” and “categories”.
At the level of pre-comparative tertia, it is obvious from the very beginning of the
text that Reding by “Greek categories” means “Aristotle’s categories”, although it
becomes later a matter of concern to what extent “category” here is a translation-
al term for katêgoria only, semantically showing more overlap with the English
“predication” or “predicate” (pp. 84–85), which of course is already reflected
in the traditional Latin title Predicamenta. Reding also speaks of “Aristotle’s cat-
egories” in the context of “the Greek theory of categories developed by Aristotle
and variously used also by other Greek philosophers, such as Plato, for exam-
ple…” (p. 83). This claim of a “Greek theory of categories” may be read as one
answer to the tension in Reding’s essay between the title’s talk of “Greek catego-
ries” and the essay’s almost exclusive focus on “Aristotle’s categories”. Another
answer would relate the words “Greek” and “Chinese” in the title not to some
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Greece and China, but to the Greek and Chinese language and to the (in Reding’s
view mistaken) view that categories are relative to language. In Reding’s text, it
is also made abundantly clear that the “and” in “Chinese and Greek categories”
is not implying an exclusivity in the sense of “if a category is not Chinese then it
must be Greek” and vice versa. Reding begins his text with Benveniste’s sugges-
tion of an “African Aristotle” and Kagame’s La philosophie bantu-rwandaise de
l’être and also offers a short discussion of “Indian categories”, which he pursues
no further due to his admitted “ignorance of Indian philosophy”, but also and
more importantly due to the fact that “Sanskrit is, like Greek, an Indo-European
language” (p. 67) and they are therefore not “wholly independent of each other”
(p. 68). It is thus that “Chinese categories” in Reding’s reasoning emerge as the
ideal case for testing the view that categories are relative to language. There is
therefore an explicit reason given for the choice of the second comparandum.
Reding’s comparison at the end of his essay, however, is not simply juxta-
posing Aristotle’s list of categories (or Aristotle’s or the Greek theory of catego-
ries) with some Chinese list of categories (or some Chinese theory of categories).
Rather, not unlike Collingwood’s emphasis on reading all statements as answers
to questions (1944: pp. 24–33; 1998: p. 23), he is seeking to “go back to the ques-
tion, to the philosophical problem, to which Aristotle’s table of categories has
been the answer” (p. 84) or, using a slightly different formulation, to “go back
to the intention or to the motives that lay behind Aristotle’s theory of the catego-
ries” (p. 68). Looking at Aristotle’s earliest available lists of categories, those in
the Topics and the Categories, Reding reconstructs the “function of the doctrine
of categories” (p. 86) as related to problems raised by “irregular” and “regular
predication” in the context of the “search for definitions” (p. 85): “a definition
must… bring together terms belonging to one and the same logical type” (p.
86). Since such “logical types” or “categories” are easily confused in Greek,
there is a “necessity to draw a list of categories and to provide criteria independ-
ent of language to identify them” (p. 87). “Real homonymy” is a phenomenon
causing such confusing, as Reding illustrates by “different categorical meanings
of ‘good’” – thus introducing Aristotle’s notion of “focal meaning” (p. 86). It is
then with this “question in mind” that Reding turns to “classical Chinese philos-
ophy” to “see if any of the ancient Chinese philosophers did ask the same ques-
tions as Aristotle, and if so, what these answers were and what role, if any, lin-
guistic considerations had played in giving these answers” (p. 68). The “same
questions”, Reding claims, were asked by the Later Mohists. Their “dialectic
bian” aimed at establishing “the correct description and definition of basic
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terms, chiefly of those belonging to the domain of ethics” (p. 87).⁶ And like Ar-
istotle the Later Mohists experience a “conflict between logical and linguistic
structures” (p. 89), although that happens to much a lesser extent. As Reding il-
lustrates, it happens when they, too, are faced with the problem of homonymy.
The more complex answer to the question of what is being compared with what
in Reding’s text can now be stated explicitly: on the one hand, the Greek catego-
ries, as they are established in Aristotle’s early writings of the Topics and Cate-
gories; on the other hand, Chinese categories, as they can be found in the Later
Mohists’ texts, both understood as answers to the problem of finding criteria for
solving conflicts between logical and linguistic structures arising from attempts
at definitions, which is therefore the fundamental pre-comparative tertium.
There are, of course, other pre-comparative tertia; most prominently among
them is the assertion that both Aristotle and the Later Mohists are to be under-
stood as being engaged in “philosophy”. Throughout the text, Reding leaves no
doubt that what is juxtaposed is “philosophers” here and there grappling with
“philosophical” problems. Due to the fact that Reding nowhere sets out to com-
pare “Greek and Chinese categories” in view of each being the products of “phi-
losophy”, there is no doubt that in his comparison “philosophy” functions not as
a tertium comparationis, but rather as a pre-comparative tertium. That it is the
context of philosophy within which both comparanda are to be situated is pre-
sumed from the outset and never comes to be questioned. At the level of the ter-
tia comparationis, there are several explicit respects along which Reding com-
pares both comparanda, e.g. the kind of text (lecture notes vs. “the result and
the final product of several generations of thinkers”, p. 89), the mention of dif-
ficulties encountered in finding the answer to the problem (recorded in detail by
Aristotle vs. a seeming mention of the result in the Mohist case), the way of deal-
ing with the problem of homonymy, the use of examples or the facility “in rec-
ognizing categorical distinctions” (pp. 90–91).
The result of the comparison is stated after Reding quotes from the Later
Mohists the famous statement on incomparability in terms of the measure be-
tween the length (chang) of a night and a piece of wood or the value (gui) of ar-
istocratic rank, one’s own parents, right conduct and a price (B 6), and deserves
to be quoted in full:
Theorem B 6 thus shows that categorical distinctions are not unknown in ancient China.
There too, these distinctions came to light as a result of a strong preoccupation with defi-
nition. The most important result for our inquiry is that when the Later Mohists draw dis-
 Here then it becomes evident that it might not all be that much of a stretch to relate Reding’s
text to a discussion about “ethics”.
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tinctions, these appear to coincide exactly with categorical distinctions also made by Aris-
totle. Moreover, the tie that holds together the four senses of gui, ‘dear’, can be equated
with the Aristotelian ‘focal meaning’. (p. 89)
The last sentence of the quote suggests that the Later Mohists like Aristotle
would also have drawn a distinction between chance and real homonymy and
also have explained the latter as the result of a convergence of the other terms
(senses of gui) towards one “focal meaning”, which in the case of “good” Reding
identifies as “good as an ousia ‘essence’ = God” whereas he abstains from iden-
tifying one of the meanings in the case of gui, there instead referring to “the tie
that holds together the four senses”.
Analysis of “Means and Means: A Comparative Reading of
Aristotle’s Ethics and the Zhongyong”
Plaks’s essay (2002) is a seemingly straightforward comparative inquiry and is
clearly structured in four parts: “Preliminary Remarks”, “The Mean in Ancient
Greece”, “The Mean in Chinese Thought”, and “Concluding Remarks”. It does
not take much to see that the subtitles apparently suggest a set of comparanda
different from the one mentioned in the title. But, perhaps, the subtitles are
merely meant to indicate that Plaks’s “comparative reading” includes a contex-
tualization of both texts in terms of “ancient Greece” and “Chinese thought” re-
spectively. The wonderful (homonymic?) title of “means and means” immediate-
ly raises the question whether and in what sense “means” might be either a pre-
comparative tertium or rather the one main tertium comparations in respect of
which both comparanda are to be compared. Hence, based on the title only,
one would perhaps expect that both Aristotle’s Ethics and the Zhongyong deal
with a notion of “means”, although it would remain unclear whether or not it
is the same notion or rather two notions. The main feature that requires exten-
sive analysis is, as will become clear soon, the simple question of what is com-
pared with what in Plaks’s “comparative reading”.
An analysis makes it clear that the text is indeed mainly comparing Aristo-
tle’s Ethics and the Zhongyong in their contexts, but that the comparative claims
that emerge from this comparison are meant to have implications far beyond
these “two classical sources” (p. 189), to what Plaks variously refers to as
“early Greece and China” (p. 187), “two traditions” (p. 188), “the Greeks… and
their Axial Age counterparts in East Asia” (p. 188), “China’s intellectual founda-
tions” and “those of the Eastern Mediterranean” (p. 188), “two cultural tradi-
tions” (p. 188), “early Chinese and Greek moral philosophy” (p. 188), “different
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intellectual traditions” (p. 189), or “two civilizations” (p. 189). In other words, on
the basis of what is compared to what, the comparison seems to be about the two
texts; on the basis of the results of the comparison, the comparison seems to be
about “the two civilizations”. The divergence between what is compared and the
implications which are attached to the comparison may explain why Plaks choo-
ses to refer to the mean in ancient Greece and in Chinese thought at the level of
subtitles. Perhaps the text is best understood as offering a comparison within a
comparison; there are certainly multiple levels of comparanda involved.
The divergence I have just mentioned certainly does not go unnoticed, as is
clear from Plaks’s reflections in the “Preliminary Remarks”. In these methodo-
logical reflections, Plaks highlights “the truism that no general propositions re-
garding ancient or modern China – or Greece, for that matter – can possibly lay
claim to uncontested validity” (p. 188). This allows him to brush aside the prob-
lem that most such propositions are quickly challenged by a plethora of counter-
examples. Given that no uncontested validity is claimed, we are – Plaks suspects
– “free to indulge in the luxury of inconsistency as we tailor our generalizing and
essentializing pronouncements about the uniqueness of China to the varying ex-
pectations of our listeners” (p. 188). That China is “unique” is of course itself ei-
ther a truism (e.g. if everything only by virtue of being a distinct thing is consid-
ered “unique”) or a presupposition that would require substantiation by way of
comparing China in all possible regards with all possible comparanda. Plaks en-
gages the two texts explicitly “in this spirit” of free indulgence in inconsisten-
cies. Mentioning “the doctrine of the mean” as a “rather marked point of inter-
section” between the two “cultural traditions” and “the strikingly similar points
of departure and the broadly similar formulation of the central issues” in the two
texts, Plaks reminds the reader that “this degree of commonality may, however,
have less to do with parallel patterns of conception and more to do with basic
common sense” (p. 189). That “thinkers from different intellectual traditions”
(p. 189) would all be concerned with “the salutary effects of moderation” and
would want to “depart from any mechanically defined ‘middle way’” (p. 189),
in Plaks’s view, is to be expected. But Plaks is not so concerned about such com-
monsensical commonalities, as the statement concluding his “Preliminary Re-
marks” demonstrates:
Nevertheless, a more systematic investigation of the precise shape of the argument in these
and other relevant classical texts may help to shed light on certain significant divergences
in philosophical assumptions and modes of argumentation, and this may perhaps put us
on firmer ground for indulging in speculative generalization on the substance of these
two civilizations. (p. 189)
42 Ralph Weber
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 06.12.16 10:43
This statement is remarkable. Not only does it introduce a remarkable list of pre-
comparative tertia (the two texts are both considered “classical”, both related to
“philosophical assumptions” and “modes of argumentation” as well as to “civi-
lizations” that are said to have a “substance”), but it also illustrates how Plaks’s
comparison of Aristotle’s Ethics and the Zhongyong is based on the presupposi-
tion of “significant divergences” (in line with his assertion of the uniqueness of
his comparanda) and thought to have implications for the much wider context of
the mean in ancient Greece and in Chinese thought and even beyond that. Ob-
viously, at this point, it would be equally fair to say that Plaks compares
Greek and Chinese civilizations understood as each having a “substance” (!)
that is articulated in the two classical texts as it is to say that Plaks compares
Aristotle’s Ethics and the Zhongyong understood as classic articulations of the
“substance” of the Greek and Chinese civilizations. It basically amounts to say-
ing the same thing, since the texts and the two civilizations are so intimately re-
lated in Plaks’s presentation.
Given this statement, the gist of Plaks’s comparison in the two central parts
of the text may come as a surprise to the reader. In the first part, Plaks discusses
the notion of the mean in ancient Greece, i.e. in pre-Socratic discourse and in
Platonic dialogues, but mainly in Aristotle’s ethical writings, for only in Aristotle
do we find “a comprehensive argument regarding the application of the principle
of the mean in the pursuit of moral excellence” (p. 191); in the second part, in
almost parallel fashion, he investigates the notion of the mean in Chinese
thought by referring to many earlier sources than the Zhongyong, the text
which of course he also discusses in some detail, but – in contrast with the
first part – he then decides to show that the “central thrust of the Zhongyong
… found expression in a number of exegetical and expository writings from
Han through Song” (p. 198). Perhaps this might be taken as an indication that
Plaks is not so sure as he is in Aristotle’s case that we find in the Zhongyong
the “comprehensive argument” with regard to “the mean in Chinese thought”.
This is further corroborated by Plaks’s use of vocabulary in the second part,
in which he speaks of the “’argument’ on moral equilibrium in the Zhongyong”
using quotation marks for “argument” (p. 196), but later comes to deploy the
same word without quotation marks (“the integral argument of the Zhongyong”,
p. 198), or speaks of the “message” of the Zhongyong first without (p. 195) and
then with quotations marks (p. 199). This is of course interesting also for another
reason since “modes of argumentation” has above been identified as a pre-com-
parative tertium.
Be that as it may, the reader may be caught unawares by Plaks’s comparative
reading as he is almost exclusively concerned with pointing out “the common
conception and expression in those two unrelated sources” (p. 199). Throughout
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the discussion of “the mean in Chinese thought”, Plaks over and again empha-
sizes how “Aristotle’s ethical treatises resonate unmistakably” in “several impor-
tant points” with the Zhongyong (p. 194), that both texts “seem very much con-
cerned with steering a correct ethical course determined by markers somewhere
along each spectrum of variation, with the aim of arriving at a state of perfection
of the individual character and participating in sustaining a broader world
order” (p. 195), that “in the Zhongyong, several points nearly identical to those
made in Aristotle’s Ethics virtually leap off the page” (p. 196), and that in the “ex-
tension of the ideal of equilibrium to the realm of public affairs, we see, once
again, an obvious point of convergence with the vision of the mean in Aristotle’s
Ethics” (p. 199). In his “Concluding Remarks” he will add to this that “both Ar-
istotle and the compiler of chapters 2 through 11 of the Zhongyong are of common
mind” (p. 199) in some “very visible points of similarity” (p. 200). There is in the
entire discussion of the mean in Chinese thought only one instance in which
Plaks admits a difference between Aristotle’s Ethics and the Zhongyong
(which, however, is only a difference in degree in terms of Chinese thought) con-
cerning zhong versus meson or mesotês in respect of being a “borrowed geomet-
rical term” (p. 196).
But Plaks has not forgotten his interest for “significant divergence” (p. 199),
and it seems as if he had reserved all discussion of it for his “Concluding Re-
marks”. There, he asks himself how we should “account for the noticeably differ-
ent directions taken by the respective arguments?” (p. 200). Plaks offers two ex-
planations. The first explanation regards the “markedly more rigorous
preoccupation with logical method and in particular mathematical reasoning
in classic Greek philosophy” if compared with the few “peripheral” sources
“in early Chinese intellectual discourse” (p. 200). Although this point partially
refers back to the one difference noted by Plaks in his discussion of the mean
in Chinese thought, it deserves emphasis that this divergence in no way results
from his comparison of Aristotle’s Ethics and the Zhongyong, but is plainly a new
assertion (on the basis of another comparison?). The second explanation draws
on the “issue of justice” that “in early Chinese texts” is not developed to the ex-
tent it is in “Greek moral philosophy” (p. 200). Plaks mentions the Zhongyong,
but is quick to add that the situation is no different in other Confucian texts.
Again, the divergence is hardly the result of Plaks’s comparison. Both these di-
vergences regard the “different directions” that the “respective arguments”
have taken, not the “arguments” themselves. It is from this point of view that
Plaks even draws out the contrast further and far beyond ancient Greece to
“Western conceptions of justice” in general (p. 200). Following this discussion
of “different directions” are two differences that directly relate to the two texts
and that indeed follow from Plaks’s comparison (pp. 200–201), but both differ-
44 Ralph Weber
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 06.12.16 10:43
ences are immediately smoothed over by pointing towards potential similarities
with other texts from each “civilization”. In any case, Plaks’s text ends with a jux-
taposition of eudaimonia with “the central Confucian concept of ‘cultivation of
the self ’ (修身)”, i.e. concepts that are first declared to be “more or less syno-
nymous”, but then are found to be different, just to be “ultimately” considered
similar again (p. 201). Indeed, Plaks ventures to say that the Zhongyong, if avail-
able to Plato and Aristotle, would have struck them as “very much the vision of
the fulfillment of their much-sought eudaimonia” (p. 201).
III From Analysis to Evaluation
The theoretical analysis of comparison and the two exemplary analyses with
their emphasis on pre-comparative tertia may suggest that the precision in
which commonalities are initially stated would provide a most obvious criterion
for successful comparison. The more precision, the better, one might think. This
is largely correct, but not entirely. Pre-comparative vagueness generally and
often is an indication that the comparer might be unaware of or unwilling to
admit (for whatever reason) some commonalities (i.e. comparative claims) that
are posited by the way the comparison is set up. There is, however, a specific
kind of pre-comparative vagueness for which this does certainly not hold. The
gap already mentioned, namely the one every comparative inquiry necessarily
produces between comparanda and comparata, builds on this kind of pre-com-
parative vagueness. Instead of vagueness, one might of course use other terms
and speak of shallowness or superficiality, but each of these would then not
stand for a deficiency of the comparison, but rather for a necessary condition.
Because only if one has a vague or shallow or superficial or presumptive under-
standing of that which is to be compared, may one find it worthwhile to engage
in comparison in the first instance. There are two important conclusions to be
drawn from viewing pre-comparative vagueness from this vantage point. One
is that the mere fact of there being pre-comparative vagueness as such is not
a problem, it is not sufficient for a criticism of a given comparison – indeed
someone thinking it sufficient would perhaps only showcase his or her own ig-
norance of what a comparison is, at least along my analysis – for pre-compara-
tive vagueness is the very condition of comparison. But there must be a threshold
regarding such pre-comparative vagueness beyond which we are still right to
criticise the comparer for not making it clear enough what it is that he or she
by way of comparison seeks to find a deeper or a more detailed understanding
of. If too much is left vague, it seems unlikely that any one comparative inquiry
would be able to remove that vagueness satisfactorily. Still, how are we to deter-
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mine that threshold? The second conclusion regards the locus of vagueness,
which I have been careful to qualify as “pre-comparative” vagueness. It seems
that if and to the extent that vagueness can be explained by the gap between
comparanda and comparata, that there should be less vagueness in the compar-
er’s claims once the comparison has been conducted, lest it should emerge that
the comparison has been entirely unsuccessful, that is, not having brought sig-
nificant knowledge to what was declared unclear and was therefore left vague at
the beginning. In other words, there should be as little post-comparative vague-
ness as possible.
I am of course aware that vagueness might be valuable in other respects,
may serve other purposes and be grounded by different reasons, but at present
I am merely trying to tease as much as possible out of my analytic framework of
comparison. Only in this way is it perhaps possible to arrive at further potentially
useful distinctions. Here is another such (potentially useful) distinction. Above, I
have qualified the comparanda and the comparata as necessarily being “the
same but different”, which is I think the single most philosophical problem
that a dynamically conceived philosophy of comparison must address. But in
the light of what I have just said about the pre-comparative vagueness that a suc-
cessful comparison would remove, it might now appear as if the gap between the
comparanda and comparata were closed simply by a process of getting more pre-
cise, more detailed, and less vague about what is still the same. Instead of being
“the same, but different”, it might now appear that I could have said that the
comparanda and the comparata necessarily must be “the same, but the latter
be more precise than the former”. The comparata would turn out to be simply
the more precise version of the comparanda. Although that might well be the re-
sult in some cases of comparison, I would not want to generalize. On the contra-
ry: it seems to me that in the process of comparison, in the transformation from
comparanda to comparata, the vagueness might even increase, in the extreme
case to the point of there being no other tertia than the one tertium of “being
of interest to the comparer” in complete ignorance of what it is that is of interest.
The point is that, rather than the same comparandum getting more precise, the
very act of comparing may change the understanding and presentation of that
same comparandum, even alter it, or exchange, substitute it with another, an al-
together different understanding, perhaps even foregrounding an altogether dif-
ferent comparandum. That comparison has the power to force such moves on the
comparer might be one of its most intriguing features. Carried to such an ex-
treme, a comparison leading to substitution of this kind probably rightly
would be considered unsuccessful in light of the original project, yet it is a nat-
ural event in the process leading up to the project. More importantly, in a less
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extreme fashion, such alteration is intimately tied to the process of comparison
itself.
It is evident that a general answer to the question of successful comparison
has to operate at a fairly abstract level in order to be able to accommodate a wide
variety of comparisons. A general answer based on my analytic framework can
only be formulated at an abstract level also for another reason: criteria for a
comparative inquiry may be extracted to the extent that the inquiry is “compa-
rative” – which is what I am concerned about – but many such criteria depend
on it being more generally an “inquiry” – which is what I am not concerned
about in this chapter. A discussion of criteria for successful or failed inquiry
would lead far beyond my analytic framework of comparison to issues such as
who determines, how, and on what basis the meaning and end of (academic) in-
quiry.
Still, at the abstract level, some rough-and-ready criteria for distinguishing a
successful comparison may be given:
– A good comparison is as explicit as possible about the main aspects of the
comparison, about what is compared with what, what pre-comparative tertia
are claimed, in what regards the comparanda are compared, and about the
relations established by the comparison.
– When writing down the presupposed pre-comparative tertia, the list should
not be confusingly long.
– It should be reasoned how the pre-comparative tertia relate to the comparan-
da.
– If there is vagueness, it should relate to the purpose of the inquiry, and that
vagueness should have been removed at the end of the comparison.
– If two comparanda are compared in a certain respect and that respect is
qualified as being “similar”, then it should be made clear in what respect
they are considered “similar” until one arrives at a respect that is claimed
to be the “same”.
– The comparata should neither be the same nor completely different from the
comparanda. If it is, then we are facing a failed comparison, one that has ei-
ther under- or over-performed.
These are merely examples of criteria that might be derived from the analytic
framework that I have presented. But all of that requires much further elabora-
tion. My experience in analysing comparisons hitherto suggests that the analysis
of pre- and post-comparative tertia, of which often the comparer is entirely un-
aware, might offer the greatest potential in terms of evaluation. To keep one’s
pre-and post-comparative tertia fully in view, few in number and well-reasoned
is a very difficult business.
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Evaluation of “Greek and Chinese Categories”
There is much that recommends Reding’s text on “Greek and Chinese categories”
(2004) as a candidate for a successful comparison, including its high degree of
sensitivity towards methodological problems. This is, for instance, impressively
demonstrated when, after his comparative comments, Reding is quick to concede
that he had been “looking at the Later Mohists’ achievements from a rather Ar-
istotelian perspective” and therefore should conclude his study “with a few con-
siderations on how the Later Mohists have understood themselves, and on what
they think they were doing when we say that they have been distinguishing be-
tween Aristotelian categories” (p. 91). Yet, this very statement also raises doubts
about the comparison that he had just presented. The declared aim was to see
whether “any of the ancient Chinese philosophers did ask the same questions
as Aristotle” (p. 68). For Reding’s argumentation, it seemed crucial that this
quest for Chinese philosophers asking the same questions as Aristotle would
not amount to “one of the fatal dangers threatening any comparative analysis,
namely, that of mistaking a superficial resemblance for a deep structural affini-
ty” (pp. 83–84) as when one were simply to “start off from the bare list of Aris-
totle’s categories” (p. 83). So, when the Chinese philosophers asked these ques-
tions, it seems crucial that they really asked these questions and not others.
Declaring his analysis as having been done under a “rather Aristotelian perspec-
tive” casts doubt on whether Reding has succeeded in offering a better basis for
comparison than the straightforward comparison on the basis of the bare list.
The considerations that he offers about what the Later Mohists thought they
were doing still draw on comparison and appeal to a distinction in “the back-
ground” and “cultural attitude” that makes the Aristotelian categories “ontolog-
ical” and the “Later Mohists’ categories … criteria for naming correctly” (p. 91).
So it is still “categories”, “definitions” and “philosophy” on both sides. Upon
closer examination, Reding leaves the reader slightly baffled as to what exactly
the difference is between his considerations from a rather Aristotelian perspec-
tive and his considerations from the Later Mohists’ perspective. Despite “appa-
rently fundamental differences” in the respective contexts “of definition”,
which is the result of reconsidering the matter decidedly from the Later Mohists’
perspective, Reding concludes that “both approaches start from a common
point, namely, from the experience of category confusions, provoked by mislead-
ing semantic and syntactical structures” (p. 92). But even when operating under
a “rather Aristotelian perspective” and discussing a set of Later Mohists’ defini-
tions, Reding had already noted that “these definitions do not obey the strict Ar-
istotelian pattern of a genus followed by a differentia”, thus emphasizing differ-
ence, only to highlight commonality in the next sentence, writing: “Nevertheless,
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they are true definitions in the sense, namely, that the definiens states what the
definiendum essentially is” (p. 88).
Throughout the text, this ambivalence shows as Reding seems to dither be-
tween assertions of commonality and assertions of similarity. Regarding the
questions that both Aristotle and his Chinese counterpart are supposed to
have asked, Reding in one instance describes his task as discovering “if some-
body among the ancient pre-Han philosophers did ask questions similar to the
ones raised by Aristotle” (p. 82) and in another instance as finding “somebody
who has asked the same questions as Aristotle” (p. 82). Later, Reding asks the
reader to “note, incidentally, that Aristotle’s investigations in the Topics closely
resemble the Later Mohists’ project” (p. 88) and remarks that “the Later Mohists
experienced, though in a different linguistic setting, a situation similar to Aris-
totle’s” (p. 89). For all that similarity (the respect in which such similarity is
claimed is not always made clear), it is astonishing that when registering the
“most important result for our inquiry”, Reding chooses to speak of the Later
Mohists’ distinctions as “coincid[ing] exactly” with some of Aristotle’s categori-
cal distinctions; and writes that “the tie that holds together the four senses of gui
… can be equated with the Aristotelian ‘focal meaning’” (p. 89). This last state-
ment is also astonishing, since nowhere in the text is any reason given why they
“can be equated”. It is therefore not a “result” of the comparative inquiry, but
rather a new comparative claim to be tested by an inquiry, a claim that is
being smuggled into the statement of results of another comparative inquiry.
Reding’s essay brings to light a fundamental difficulty of any comparison.
The methodologically sensitive comparer might be hesitant in claiming a com-
monality between two comparanda. This is evident in Reding’s rejection of a
comparison based on the bare list of Aristotle’s categories and also in his ambig-
uous statements with regard to the status and nature of definition on both sides.
Yet a comparison must be based on one or several asserted commonalities. Any
such assertion is open for challenge on grounds of it not really denoting a com-
monality. When Reding declares Aristotle’s and the Later Mohists’ definitions
both to be “true definitions”, then that might be challenged by pointing out
the inadequateness of the definition of what makes a true definition, i.e. “the
definiens states what the definiendum essentially is”, on the very grounds that
Reding himself later invokes when distinguishing between an ontological en-
deavour on Aristotle’s side and a concern for different kinds of naming on the
side of the Later Mohists. But it might also be challenged on Reding’s own ad-
monition that it is important to ask what problems such attempts at definition
were trying to answer, which – to be fair – is exactly what he does, thus arriving
at the common problem of fighting against languages whose structures are more
or less hostile to categorical distinctions. Yet, this answer is predicated on the
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pre-comparative tertia of logical and linguistic structures working in the same
manner in both comparanda. That this is a useful distinction (logical vs. linguis-
tic structures) is not explicitly argued in Reding’s text, but it is the fundament on
which the entire comparison rests – as is the pre-comparative tertium of philo-
sophy, which is not substantiated or explicated in the text.
Evaluation of “Means and Means: A Comparative Reading of
Aristotle’s Ethics and the Zhongyong”
My analysis of Plaks (2002) and his “comparative reading” has mainly empha-
sized and sought to disentangle various levels of comparanda, and it is from
there that my evaluation takes its starting-point. The first part of the title is a
wonderful way of articulating the pre-comparative vagueness that the successful
comparative inquiry would be expected to have removed at the end of the com-
parison: “means and means”. Although Plaks in the two central parts of his text
deals with that vagueness and succeeds in removing some of it (mainly by point-
ing out commonalities), the differences between the “two classical texts” men-
tioned rather briefly in his “Concluding Remarks” eventually leave the reader
without a clear result from the comparison. Granted that any comparison will al-
ways yield commonalities as well as differences in one or the other respect,
would a successful comparison not be expected to give an overall assessment,
in Plaks’s case, answering the question of how the briefly mentioned differences
weigh against the many commonalities emphasized in the central parts of the
text? Or more precisely: how, in the comparer’s assessment, do the respects in
which the two comparata are found to be different weigh against the respects
in which they are found to be similar? Do many respects of similarity outweigh
a few respects of difference? Or may one respect of difference be of such impor-
tance as to outweigh many respects of similarity? Can these questions be an-
swered on the basis of two comparata only, or would the answer depend on
the inclusion of further comparanda? These are tricky questions, but it seems
to me that some answer should be offered lest comparisons turn out simply to
reproduce in their results the truism that there are differences and commonali-
ties; that much, to be sure, was known from the outset.
Above I have emphasized that the necessary pre-comparative vagueness that
the inquiry seeks to address is to be distinguished from a pre-comparative vague-
ness that might inform the comparanda but is not part of that which is to be in-
quired. The many different descriptions at the level of the two comparanda as
“two civilizations” in Plaks’s text, in my view, introduce a vagueness that is pre-
cisely of the latter kind. It is not clear how each description is thought to relate to
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the others, and the question is never addressed in the comparison itself. These
comparanda remain vague from beginning to end. This is all the more disconcert-
ing since the comparison of Aristotle’s Ethics and the Zhongyong is meant to re-
veal something about these comparanda, for the comparison should “put us on
firmer ground for indulging in speculative generalization on the substance of
these two civilizations” (p. 189). Remember that the pre-comparative vagueness
that motivates the inquiry at the level of the “two civilizations” concerns the
question of their “substance” and is different from the pre-comparative vague-
ness introduced by the many different descriptions of the “two civilizations”.
There is a related problem. Given that Plaks emphasizes commonalities to an ex-
tent that would perhaps warrant our suspicion that his overall assessment of dif-
ferences and commonalities would lean towards the latter, it is entirely unclear
how that finding, i.e. the finding of a high degree of commonality, would possi-
bly come to support his presuppositions about “certain significant divergences in
philosophical assumptions and modes of argumentation” in ancient Greece and
Chinese thought, which is the explicitly stated aim at the beginning of the com-
parison. Or, are we here facing an instance of a comparison in which the com-
parer simply by virtue of comparing has ended up with a set of comparata sig-
nificantly different from the comparanda, perhaps to his own surprise?
Finally, there is a certain imbalance in Plaks’s treatment of the two compa-
randa that requires further attention. When he discusses the mean in ancient
Greece, Plaks does not once refer to Chinese thought. His discussion of the
mean in Chinese thought, however, begins straight away with a comparative
claim, and throughout that part such cross-references frequently occur. One pos-
sible explanation for this would be to say that Plaks has a firmer grasp on the
comparandum that is ancient Greece and cannot but portray the mean in Chinese
thought comparatively, i.e. cannot but establish the second comparandum in
view of the first comparandum. But this is not the case. Plaks uses virtually no
Aristotelian language to describe what the Zhongyong and other Chinese texts
are about. Another explanation is more straightforward. The cross-referencing
in terms of commonalities in the second part might simply be what Plaks under-
stands by a “comparative reading” (perhaps drawing more on the meaning of
“comparable” as “substitutable”), but it would not make much sense to include
in the first part similar cross-references to a comparandum that is not yet dis-
cussed. Be that as it may, the structure of Plaks’s text – discussion of the first
comparandum, comparative reading of the second comparandum in terms of
commonalities only, and concluding remarks including a comparative reading
in terms of differences and some further commonalities at the other level of com-
paranda, is certainly remarkable.
On Comparing Ancient Chinese and Greek Ethics 51
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 06.12.16 10:43
IV Conclusions
Before concluding with my main findings, I should like to note some limitations
of my analytic approach to comparison. A general limitation is perhaps captured
by asking (drawing on Stanley Fish’s question about poems), “how do you re-
cognize a comparison if you see one?” – meaning that my framework presuppos-
es a concept of comparison to which one might want to object, e.g. on the
grounds of conceptual narrowness or overstretch. For example, one sort of com-
parison which my framework seems perhaps ill-suited to handle is less about in-
quiry, but more playful, more artful. For comparison can be viewed like an asso-
ciative mechanism, where the throwing of something unexpected next to the all
too familiar might be used to break conventional chains of associations. In this
sense, vague or what others have called illegitimate comparisons might be
programmatically pursued and turn out to be highly productive. This would ap-
proximate to a sort of random selection of comparanda, although I would hasten
to add that there would still be relevant pre-comparative tertia that an analysis
could make explicit (the presupposition of the two comparanda not usually
being put one next to the other would probably be based on a set of differences
that would be different in some regard and thus would be based on a specific
common grid of criteria rather than on another). But if comparison is understood
as an associative machine, then the whole point is to abstain from any reflection
about the pre-comparative tertia.
The second limitation that I want to mention is more challenging. It con-
cerns the application of my analytic framework itself, which is modelled on
the actual practice and specific temporality of a comparer engaging in a compar-
ison, whereas the resulting text describing the comparison often does not mirror
that process but is carefully constructed and revised, artificially and artfully nar-
rated, and so on and so forth. The less the actual text mirrors the process of com-
parison, the more the power of my analytical framework might be limited, or, on
a less pessimistic note, the more work the analyst of comparison has to invest in
a reconstruction of that process. Reding’s text may be a case in point. Whereas
he begins with thinking about “Chinese categories” and more than once initially
states that the task ahead is to find out “if any of the ancient Chinese philoso-
phers did ask the same questions as Aristotle” (p. 68), it is rather obvious that
from the outset he has already decided on the Later Mohists as the best candi-
dates, although he only mentions them about two thirds into the text (and there-
after consistently speaks of “Chinese philosophers”). Throughout the text, no
other candidates are ever considered. At the face of it, the analysis of the text
would probably recommend “Chinese philosophers” as part of a pre-compara-
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tive tertium and the “Later Mohists” as the result of a decision taken in the trans-
formation of comparanda into comparata, perhaps taken once the tertium com-
parationis of Aristotle’s questions has been more firmly established and is about
to be applied to ancient China. The circumstantial evidence (such as the salience
of the Later Mohists in the chapter preceding the one on “Greek and Chinese Cat-
egories”) would not support this analysis. The way a comparison is presented is
hardly ever the way it is conducted in the first instance (and there are certainly
good reasons for this state of affairs).
Whereas the tertium comparationis and the introduced related set of distinc-
tions have in my view great value as a tool of analysis and thereby provide some
firmer ground on which to evaluate comparisons, the latter task remains a much
more complicated affair. This is so not only due to the importance of evaluative
criteria beyond ‘comparative’ inquiry (the ones of inquiry more generally), but
also due to the importance of taking into account the specific purposes that
the comparer might pursue with the comparison. These purposes may vary great-
ly. In some comparisons, the comparer might be interested in establishing the
equivalence of two comparanda; in others the purpose might be to demonstrate
the ‘uniqueness’ of one or both comparanda. Some comparisons are more inter-
ested in one of the comparanda than the other. A comparison might be conduct-
ed with the aim of “doing justice” to each or all of the comparanda, or it might
not be that much about the comparanda at all, but aim at drawing merely inspi-
ration from them or to make instrumental use of them. For some comparisons,
it might be a reason for negative evaluation if it can be shown that the one com-
parandum substantially coincides with the tertia comparationis (e.g. if the
Zhongyong is read in Aristotelian terms); in other cases that might be the very
condition to ensure a successful comparison. The point is that each of these pur-
poses may be backed by good reasons.
Of course, the analyst of comparison may disagree with the purposes attach-
ed to a comparison, but it would seem important to distinguish between negative
evaluations based on a criticism of the aims pursued and negative evaluations
relating to a failure to achieve the declared purpose and the concomitant claims
of the comparison itself. Conversely, positive evaluations based on pursuing the
same purpose should be distinguished from internally derived positive evalua-
tions. Such evaluation, in any case, would require that the comparer and the an-
alyst of comparison are clear about the pursued purposes and make them clear.
Often it seems that comparers (and probably also analysts of comparison) are
committed to several purposes at once. Plaks’s text perhaps is an example of
this tendency with its operating at several levels simultaneously. In Reding’s
terms, one should make it clear what question one seeks to answer. Collingwood
(1998: p. 38) makes the point nicely:
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When a question first comes into one’s mind it is generally (I speak for myself, and perhaps
I am not here very different from other people) a confused mass of different questions, all of
which, because all must be answered before I can catch my dinner, and because I am hun-
gry, I ask at once. But they cannot all be answered at once. Before they can be answered
they must be distinguished, and the nest of questions resolved into a list of questions
where each item is one question and only one.
If comparison often start out with a “confused mass of different questions”, then
certainly also the analyst of comparison does. The main questions that my chap-
ter has sought to set out for discussion concern how to conceive an analytic
framework of comparison that captures the dynamic aspects of the process of
comparison as well as whether and if, how, that framework may be used as a
tool for analysis and also for evaluation. The distinctions drawn between the ter-
tium comparationis and the pre-comparative tertium, between the comparanda
and the comparata, between the pre-comparative vagueness that the compara-
tive inquiry seeks to remove and the one of which the comparer is unaware,
and perhaps the problem of how to weigh the respects of difference and the re-
spects of commonality so as to arrive at an overall assessment are amongst my
main findings. Many of these aspects have so far received scant attention in com-
parative studies and all of them require much more thought, not least because
comparison is fundamental to academic and non-academic inquiry.
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